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INTRODUCTION
One current controlling paradigm of American
constitutional theory is that in order to function properly, the
Supreme Court must have enduring public support. 3 Working
within this paradigm, Theunis Roux in his new book offers an
account of the South African Constitutional Court's (hereinafter:
SACC) adjudication in the first decade of its existence. Yet Roux
encountered a puzzle. The SACC functioned properly without
possessing enduring public support. Rather than abandoning the
American paradigm, Roux attempted to somehow reconcile the
reality of the SACC's low public support with the logic of this
controlling paradigm. In this review I argue that Roux's findings
justify narrowing the scope of the paradigm and acknowledging
that a national high court can function properly without public
support so long as the executive branch views the Court as an
expert. Moreover, I argue that this revisionist position has ancient

1. Professor of Law and Associate Dean (Research) in the Law Faculty at the
University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia.
2. Max Wchcr Postdoctoral Fellow, European Univnsity Institute. I am grateful to
David Bilchitz, Shai Dothan, James Fowkes, and Catic Scott for their excellent comments.
All errors arc my own.
3. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 221 (2002) ("IM!any
commentators made the point that judicial power ultimately depended upon popular
acceptance."); Michael L. Wells, "Sociological Legitimacy" in Supreme Court Opinions, M
WASil. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2007) ("Like anyone who docs not live on a desert
island, the Court, in order to achieve its goals, has to he concerned with what other people
think of it. ... IT!hc Court must take care to hchavc in a way that inspires or maintains
puhlic confidence .... ").
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roots in Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 78. I explain that
only with the rise of public opinion polls did the notion that the
United States Supreme Court needs public support to function
properly ascend to the level of a controlling paradigm.
I begin by presenting Raux's thesis as an application of the
controlling legitimacy paradigm. After exposing the roots of this
paradigm in the peculiar history of the United States Supreme
Court, I explore Raux's actual findings as verifying a different
theory, the Hamiltonian one that explains courts' power and
legitimacy as based on their expertise. According to this theory,
the SACC could function properly even without public support
since the executive believed that the Court held expertise, i.e., the
governing elites believed that the judges are constitutional
"doctors." Before concluding, I examine Raux's portrayal of the
SACC's judges. According to Roux, the judges behaved as
strategic players, i.e., they were cognizant of the basic idea of the
legitimacy paradigm and acted strategically in order to recruit
public support. Based on his description, I show that belief in legal
expertise was prevalent among judges and the legal elites during
the Chaskalson Court era.
I. THE CONTROLLING PARADIGM AN[> ROUX'S

THESIS
Roux has written a magnificent book. Many texts that aim to
explain the work of national high courts offer either an account of
courts as strategic players or a thick description in which courts
are part of larger political and cultural arenas. 5 Each type of
account is prone to a set of problems. Scholars who produce
accounts according to the strategic line of thought reduce complex
human beings to the figures of "players," who act solely according
to their calculation of gains and losses.(, Under such a worldview,
belief in ideas, such as truth, independent of its instrumental-

4. THE FEDERALIST No. 7X, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacoh E. Cook cd.,
1961).
5. Sec, for example, with regards to the Israeli Supreme Court, MENACHEM
MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 54-1 XO (2011) (presenting a thick
description of Israeli society and the Supreme Court as an important player in societal
development); SHAI DOTHAN, REPUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS 163-212 (2015)
(presenting a strategic analysis of the Israeli Supreme Court's behavior).
6. See William H. Riker, Political Science and Rational Choice, in PERSPECTIVES
ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 163, 172-74 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shcpslc
cds., 1990).
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strategic value does not exist. Scholars who produce thick
descriptions attempt to avoid reductionism by purporting to
capture reality in its fullness.~ Yet absent a narrative, without an
organizing idea, the data they collected would be unmanageable.
Thus, these types of accounts are prone to disregard data that do
not fit their narrative or narrate the data in a manner that fits the
organizing idea through which the scholar views reality.
Well aware of these limitations, Roux covers the SACC's
work from both vantage points. He acknowledges that one cannot
collapse one framework into the other without losing something
substantial (p. 124). Thus, he adopts a "two-pronged approach"
that explains the SACC's work in "rational choice terms'' but also
in terms of "ideas, personalities, traditions and broader social
processes" (p. 124). This approach, coupled with his intellectual
honesty, leads Roux to present data that discredit one vantage
point but ensure a full presentation of the other.
Roux is writing under what he calls the "legitimacy theory"
(p. 37) and what I dub the "legitimacy paradigm." The difference
in titles is significant. A theory still needs to be tested. Roux never
doubts the legitimacy "theory." He assumes its validity. He then
applies it under more stringent conditions as if he was working
9
within a scientific paradigm.
According to the legitimacy paradigm, "a certain level of
public support is a precondition for whatever else a constitutional
court may hope to achieve" (p. 37). The method of assessing
public support, under this paradigm, is public opinion polling. In
other words, in order to function properly, the SACC must
possess enduring public support as measured in opinion polls.
Yet, Roux cannot deny that "the South African case appears to
defy this rule" (p. 37). There were "certain brute facts about the
Chaskalson Court's institutional legitimacy" (p. 34) that could not
be squared with the legitimacy paradigm. Surveys conducted by
James Gibson and Gregory Calderia in 1996-1997, 2001 and 2004

7. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THI' CiVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION
194 (2014) (arguing that within the rational choice "framework, 'rational' politicians arc
exclusively concerned with the pursuit of electoral advantage . . . . Anything else is
'irrational' -it happens sometimes hut should he seen as ahcrrational.").
R See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW 35 (1999) ("Scholars such
as Clifford Gccrtz and Michel Foucault emphasize that social practices arc historically
specific and that each such practice must he approached through a process of thick
description.").
9. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 23 (2nd
cd. 1970).
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showed that the Court never cultivated enduring public support.
No other opinion polls covering the first ten years of the SACC
exist, as the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) began
11
measuring public confidence in the SACC only in 2006. "[T]he
Court," writes Roux, "handed down a number of decisions in
politically controversial cases, all of which were enforced, and
none of which triggered a debilitating attack on the Court" (p. 3).
However, as Roux acknowledges, "the Court never built much
institutional legitimacy (in the sense of 'diffuse support') .... " (p.
4). He thus concludes that "the interesting thing about the
Chaskalson Court is that it was able to play its constitutionally
assigned veto role from the very outset, and that it continued to
play this role without ever building much institutional legitimacy"
(p. 4; see also pp. 15, 37-38). By examining the Chaskalson Court's
adjudication, Roux attempts to explain this puzzle. He endeavors
to show how the Court's adjudication during its first ten years of
existence does not contradict the legitimacy paradigm.
Yet, Roux does not raise the possibility that his work
disproves the controlling American paradigm and that in certain
circumstances national high courts do not need public support to
function properly. Instead, Roux in part capitulates to the
controlling paradigm. He does not view the ten first years of the
Court as a complete success since "the Court never built the kind
of public support that is ordinarily taken to be the mark of a
successful constitutional court" (p. 391 ). This partial capitulation
is surprising since Roux acknowledges the uniqueness of the
American case that triggered the rise of the legitirnacy paradigm.
He explains that
In most mature constitutional democracies, where the legalprofessional culture is premised on a relatively strong
attachment to the ideal of adjudication according to law, and
where all major political actors support the need for judicial
10. James L. Gihson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Defenders of Democracy? l-egitimacy,
Popular Acceptance, and the South African Constitutional Court, 65 .J. POL. 1, 11 (2003)
("From a comparative perspective, the South African Constitutional Court has failed to
develop a very deep reservoir of goodwill among the South African mass puhlic."); James
L. Gihson, The Evolving Legitimacy of the South African Constitutional Court, in JUSTICE
AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 221}, 246-50 (Fran~ois du
Bois & Antje du Bois-Pedain eds., 200X) (arguing hased on survey conducted in 2004 that
the SACC enjoys "low to moderate level of support .... ISjupport fm the Constitutional
Court seemed to change little hetween Jl)l)7 and 2004 .... ITihe minimalist conclusion to
he drawn is that the Court has not hroadened its support in the seven years hctween the
first and last surveys.").
11. See THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION, http://www.ijr.org
.za/political-analysis-SARB.php (last visited Sept. l), 2015).
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independence, the tension between law and politics recedes to
the background, arising only in isolated cases when a
particularly controversial case brings it to the surface (p. X9).

In a footnote he notes that "[t]he major exception is the United
States" (p. 89 n.30; see also p. 102). Indeed, in the American
public discourse, belief that legal expertise resolves constitutional
questions has eroded, making the gartisan aspect of the Court's
2
adjudication much more salient. But if the United States
Supreme Court presents such a sui generis case, why assume that
the paradigm through which it is studied will fit the SACC?
David Robertson provides a potential explanation in his
comparative study of several national high courts. Robertson
suggests that the approach to the study of courts worldwide was
devised based on the very unique context of the United States
Supreme Court as a result of American academic dominance in
13
the field of social science. This American-based approach, so
says Robertson, should not be exported so easily to other
14
countries. Similarly, Gibson and Caldeira, two of the most
prominent scholars of the "legitimacy paradigm," admit in their
article on the South African Constitutional Court that while
"legitimacy theory is widely accepted by scholars ... it is unclear
that extant findings, mostly on the U.S., are generalizable to other
15
political and legal systems." While Roux acknowledges the
influence of the American way of thinking on his work (p. 17), he
cannot break free from this American paradigm. Since for Roux
this paradigm is necessarily true, he writes that "the Court could
not escape the fact that its institutional role and thereby also its
institutional independence was premised on the Court's capacity
to sustain the public's faith in the impartiality of its interpretive
practices." (pp. 206-207).

12. See Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 2() J.L. & PoL. 23<) (2011)
(describing the decline of legal expertise in the American public mind).
13. DAVID ROBERTSON, THE JUDGE AS POLITICALTIIEORIST 21 (201 0) ("The first
characteristic of most political science research on courts is that it is American. It is either
written by Americans (about American courts- the largest single category by a long way
- or about other courts) or, less common, written by non-Americans about other courts
but in a way heavily influenced by American paradigms.").
14. !d. at 25-2() ("INion-American courts arc much less obviously political actors,
and much more cautious ones .... Political science models may more effectively apply to
American than to non-American courts simply because those models arc assessing a
different reality. Therefore, they should be exported with care.").
15. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 10, at 2-3.
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II. ROUX'S REVOLUTIONARY FINDINGS
A. FLAWS IN THE LEGITIMACY PARADIGM
Many American scholars present the controlling legitimacy
paradigm as a paraphrase of Hamilton's argument regarding the
16
judiciary's limited power in Federalist No. 78. This lends the
paradigm an aura of a timeless truth. For example, in their work
"On the Legitimacy of National High Courts," Gibson, Caldeira,
and Baird write that " [n ]ot even the most powerful courts in the
world have the power of the 'purse' or 'sword~'; with limited
institutional resources, courts are therefore uncommonly
dependent upon the goodwill of their constituents for both
support and compliance . . . courts, more than other political
17
institutions, require a deep reservoir of goodwill.''' The authors
then use public opinion polls to measure that "reservoir of
goodwill." However, the Federalist No. 78 reads differently.
Alexander Hamilton proclaimed there that "[t]he judiciary on the
contrary has no influence over either the sword or the purse ... It
may truly be said to have neither Force nor Wi[ll, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgrnents." 1x As I
19
explain at length elsewhere, according to Hamilton, the
government's support is the essential component for the efficacy
of the Court's rulings. This support is acquired because the
executive branch acknowledges the value of the Court's judgment
and not because it is fearful of public reaction if it :fails to comply
with the Court's decisions. Even if the Court gives a judgment that
is contrary to popular opinion or to the government's interests,

16. See, e.g., TOMS. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 67 (2011)
("Indeed, at least since Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist #78 that the Court is
'possessed of neither force nor will, hut merely judgment,' students of American
government have recognized that the Court is limited in its efficacy hy the necessity of
public and political will to give its decisions force."); Christopher D. Johnston & Brandon
L. Bartels, Sensationalism and Sobriety Differential Media Exposure and Attitudes Toward
American Courts, 74 PUB. OPINION Q. 260,276 (2010) (''The support of the general public
is essential to the American court system, as judges possess neither powers of
appropriation nor of sanction."); Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court?, 67 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 63,75 (2004) ("Lacking the power to appropriate funds or command
the military, the Court understands that it must act in a way that garners public
acceptance.").
17. James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy
of National lligh Courts, Y2(2) AM. POL Sci. REV. 343,343 (199X).
1X. THE FEDERALIST No. 7X, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed.,
1961).
19. See Or Bassok, The Two Countermajoritarian Difficulties, 32 ST. LOUIS lJ. PUB.
L. REV. 333, 36X-76 (2012).
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the government may still enforce the judgment in the same way a
patient may comply with a treatment that causes her pain. Thus,
Hamilton based the Court's power '"merel~" on its judicial
0
expertise; not on public support for the Court. According to the
legitimacy paradigm, the government's support is given because it
makes a strategic calculation on public support for the Court, 21
rather than because the executive believes in the Court's
expertise. Public opinion is the drive wheel of American politics,
and the government does not usually stand against a popular
institution. Moreover, according to this paradigm, even if the
Court is perceived to act politically, i.e., not as an expert, as long
as it retains public confidence, political resistance to its decisions
is unfeasible because the political costs of attacking the Court are
22
too high (p. 161 ).
The invention of public opinion polls changed how the term
legitimacy is understood, at least in the United States. This shift
has had an especially important impact on courts. First, the term
is now understood more and more in sociological terms (whether
a court has legitimacy in the eyes of the public) rather than in
normative terms (whether a court has legitimacy as a matter of
23
normative justification). Second, courts now have the ability, for
the first time in their history, to base their legitimacy on public
24
support rather than on expertise. Those who hold political power
have listened to public opinion well before the invention of public
opinion polls, but the manner in which public opinion is voiced
20. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 54 (1999)
(explaining that according to Alexander Hamilton, "the court's only claim to authority is
the force of its reason and the clear accuracy of its decision.").
21. See MATTHEW E.K. HALL, THE NATURE OF SUPREME COURT POWER 15-1X
(2011) ("[T[hc Court, like most political authorities, must rely on other political actors to
implement its decisions .... These other government actors may also he under strong
political pressure from superiors or electoral constituents to ignore the Court. ... [E [lectcd
officials may he unwilling or unable to resist the Court when it is supported hy strong public
opinion.").
22. See generally JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDt·:S OF CONSENT, at xvi (2004) ("Public
opinion matters .... Its power is that it points always to the future, telling those whose
careers and strategies depend on public support that success depends on being with the
tide, not against it."); CLARK, supra note 16, at X1-X2 ("[M[cmhcrs of Congress will
generally have an interest in correctly position-taking in line with public opinion, which is
a central activity in the pursuit of reelection.").
23. See Bassok, supra note 19, at 335-43 (explaining the change in the way scholars
confront the countcrmajoritarian difficulty: from a problem that requires a normative
justification to a problem that requires showing that the Supreme Court docs not
contradict public opinion).
24. See Or Bassok, The Supreme Court's New Source of Legitimacy. 16 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 153, 197 (2013) ("Public support as a basis of legitimacy is no longer the
monopoly of the elected branches. The Court can now rely, even if only tacitly, on public
support for the Court as a viable, independent basis of legitimacy.").
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has changed. Until the invention of public opinion polls, Congress
25
was public opinion. Countering the will of Congress meant
contravening the will of the majority of the public. But with the
rise of public opinion culture things have changed. Public opinion
polls are now the main mechanism through which the public will
is represented and thus legitimacy has become in many ways
synonymous with public support as expressed in opinion polls. As
a result of these two developments, together with the
measurement of public support for the United States Supreme
Court since the 1960s, the Supreme Court now has the ability, for
the first time in history, to base its legitimacy on public support
rather than on expertise.
Imagine the era before the invention of opinion polls. During
that period, Roux's idea of "a people's court, with its own
constituency independent of the ANC" (p. 379) would seem
problematic, to say the least. How can the Court, even tacitly,
claim to have the people's "vote" in any conflict with the people's
representatives? With no ability to reliably de1nonstrate this
support to the political branches, the value of the Court's claim
would be very low. No independent public indicator could back
up this claim to public legitimacy in a clash with the elected
branches. Of course, even before the invention of public opinion
polls, the claim that unelected institutions require public support
26
to function properly was raised. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court did speak in the name of the people or rely on
"public confidence" for the Court even before the invention of
public opinion polls. 27 But, the understanding of what it means for
the Court to hold public confidence was different . For example,
the view that the government as a whole requires public support
(rather than individual institutions) was the controlling view
before the invention of public polling. 2x
After the invention of public opinion polls, the claim that
courts possess public support can hold its ground in public
25. Amy Fried & Douglas B. Harris, Governing with the Polls, 72 THE HISTORIAN
321,323-24,341 (2010).
26. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-17X7, at 135 (1972) ("In classical Whig thought all rulers, whether English kings or
Venetian doges, supposedly derived their powers ultimately from the people; election only
made explicit what was always implicit."); id. at 612 (discussing the eighteenth century view
that all power was "derived from the puhlic opinion.") (quoting Samuel Williams).
27. See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 614, 61X (1X40) (Baldwin, J., concurring)
(asserting that the Court's power "is moral, not physical; it operates hy its influence, hy
puhlic confidence in the soundness and uniformity of the principles on which it acts.").
2R See Bassok, supra note 24, at 160 (describing the position that the legitimacy of
the system as a whole depends on puhlic opinion).
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discourse as long as polls demonstrate such support. But, while in
the United States every salient issue is probed in polls by the
media, including questions regarding Supreme Court cases, 29
Roux does not present any evidence of similar polling frenzy in
South Africa. In his account of the SACC's first ten years, he
relies on only three public opinion poll surveys that measured
support for the Court and another poll measuring support for the
Court's death penalty decision (p. 238). In view of the scarcity of
public opinion polls, his claim that the SACC's ability to function
properly between 1995 and 2005 was connected to public's
support for the Court stands on a shaky ground, even if these four
surveys had demonstrated broad support for the Court. Public
support for courts, with the exception of rare occasions when it is
manifested in elections that are focused on court-related issues, is
not by itself an exercise of power. People with power listen to it. 30
Yet, in the current era, in order for public opinion to be listened
to, it needs to be measured and made public or to be manifested
through serious public mobilization. Thus, the Court does not
need to state that it holds public support, but other institutions
need to be aware of a reliable metric demonstrating such support.
Otherwise, without a belief in the court's expertise, they may
disregard the court's decisions if their only merit is the decider's
unsupported claim to hold public support. After all, elected
representatives view their voice as the best proxy for public
support.
B. THE LEGITIMACY BASED ON EXPERTISE EXPLANATION

It is not only the use of public opinion polls, coupled with the
shift in how legitimacy is understood (public opinion culture), that
differentiates the American reality and the South African one.
After all, under the same conditions, it is difficult to find anyone
claiming that the American Federal Reserve Bank's proper
function is dependent on it holding public support. The Federal
Reserve Bank was designed as an expert institution,
unaccountable to the public that offers judgments in its realm of
31
expertise. At least until recently, it was almost undisputed for
29. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNOUIST COURT 3-4
(200R) (presenting data on the high frc4ucncy of puhlic polling with regard to the
American Supreme Court).
30. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 190 (2007) (arguing that modern puhlicsphcrc "is supposed to he listened to hy power, hut it is not itself an exercise of power.").
31. JOHN T. WOOLLEY, MONETARY POLITICS: THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE
POLITICS OF MONETARY POLICY RR (19R4) ("The Federal Reserve depends on expertise,
and economists arc the relevant experts.").

530

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 30:521

many decades that the executive complies with the Federal
Reserve judgments because of its expertise, not because of its
popular support. 32 Why is the United States Supreme Court
different? What comes to mind immediately is that noncompliance with the Federal Reserve judgment is like refusing to
33
adhere to a doctor's medical advice. But judges seem to be
perceived differently than economists. At least with regards to
salient constitutional cases, such as those dealing with the
constitutionality of the death penalty, the American public's
belief that the Justices possess any relevant expertise to decide
34
these questions has weakened. Without such expertise, all the
judiciary has is indeed public support. The Federal Reserve Bank
and its decisions to influence the interest rates are regarded
differently. This difference in how Americans imagine these two
institutions is a result of contingent historical developments. Since
the clash between FD R and the Court over the New Deal
legislation, the public's understanding that legal expertise does
not provide the Court with determinate answers in constitutional
cases, and that the law's malleability allows judges to decide cases
based on their political preferences, began to spread and has been
35
spreading ever since.
But it is evident from Roux's book, with regards to the
SACC, that the way South African governing elites imagine the
court is different than the way Americans imagine their Supreme
Court. In other words, Roux depicts how South African elites,

32. /d. at 57 ("In contrast to incumbents in top posts in other agencies (including the
Treasury), the Federal Reserve Board has had twice as many holders of doctoral degrees.
This kind of distribution is exactly what one would expect to find in an agency that relics
heavily on expertise in the conduct of policy and as a source of legitimacy.''); id. at XX ("The
Federal Reserve may he the first instance of institutionalized application of economic
expertise in the service or government.").
33. Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court's Agenda ~ and the Nation's, 120
HARV. L. REV. 4, 54-55 (200()) (claiming that there is almost no discussion of the
countcrmajoritarian difficulty with regard to the Federal Reserve Board partly because
"many people hclicvc, rightly or wrongly, that most agency decisions arc hascd on
technical knowledge which neither the people nor their directly elected representatives
possess.").
34. Bassok, supra note 12, at 247-53 (describing the erosion in public perception of
the Court's expertise); Suzanna Sherry, Democracy's Distrust: Contested Values and the
Decline of Expertise, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 7, 11 (2011) ("IMiany people no longer sec
judges as possessing legal expertise.").
35. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 3, at 171-72, 223-25 (2009) ("It would he difficult
to overstate the extent to which the public and commentators had hy mid-century become
reconciled to Realist (or anti-formalist) conceptions."); Bassok, supra note 12, at 253
("I Clonstitutional theorists generally agree that the rise in puhllic saliency or the
indeterminacy of legal norms and the decline of the Court's mythical image date hack to
the first half of the 20th century.").
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consisting mostly of the African National Congress Party (ANC),
still believe in judicial expertise even for salient constitutional
questions. They still believe in constitutional doctors. The
executive's compliance with the SACC better resembles
compliance by the American executive branch with the Federal
Reserve Bank's directives or Hamilton's vision of the United
States Supreme Court's basis of legitimacy. Do not dismiss this
opinion as a form of naivete that cannot really exist or as
something that could exist only when the world was young.
Economics is still considered in the United States to be a form of
expertise to which a different section is dedicated in newspapers
(as opposed to legal issues that appear in the general "news"
section). How can one argue otherwise? After all, there are a lot
of numbers and large spreadsheets in the economics section.
Obviously, only experts may really discern developments in the
world of economics. However, after the economic crisis of 2008,
one can easily see beyond this horizon and imagine a world in
which the salient decisions of the Federal Bank are considered as
36
political as the Court's decisions. The Federal Reserve would be
considered as a bunch of conservative, Republican economists
trying, in a countermajoritarian manner, to hinder the Democratic
President's progressive economic policy in the name of their false
expertise. After all, it would be well known that the President's
contradictory policy is supported by his own bunch of Democratic
economic "experts." Such developments, in which a field of
expertise is no longer imagined as such, do occur. As already
noted, the fallout of the struggle over the New Deal between FDR
and the United States Supreme Court is one example of this
37
process.
Roux only partly capitulates to the "legitimacy paradigm."
His analysis from the vantage point of culture and politics
provides a recipe for how a national high court, such as the SACC,
can properly function without public support. The first condition
is the existence of a dominant political force that controls the
executive. This condition ensures that the Court will not be used
as a pawn in a struggle between political forces (pp. 125-126). The
36. RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 169 (2007) (arguing that
''disputes hctwccn economists over different approaches to monetary policy" arc examples
of disputes that involve "potentially contentious moral and ideological judgments at some
level or another.").
37. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARY.
L. REV. 1147, 1157 (1993) (noting that after the New Deal, the he lief that constitutionalism
is a special expression of reason or science was undermined, and that constitutionalism
"appeared simply as another instance of rule hy political interests.").
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second condition is that the dominant political force consists of
believers in judicial expertise.
Roux links the dominance of a single political party in South
Africa (the ANC) to the SACC's ability to defy the legitimacy
paradigm. He writes that "the Court was continually able to defy
the ordinary assumptions of liberal constitutional theory by
exploiting the ANC's dominance to carve out a role for itself as
an independent check on the abuse of political power" (p. 363).
He repeatedly states that "[t]he main deterrninant of the
Chaskalson Court's insulation from political attack must have
been the ANC's interest in its independence" (p. 144; see also pp.
125-26, 186-87). For example, he explains that in the salient
decision to abolish the death penalty (S. v. Makwanyane) the
Court's ability to reject "the content of public opinion as a
determinant of constitutional meaning" was "crucially dependent
on the ANC's capacity as a dominant political party to insulate
the Court from political attacks" (p. 238; see alsop. 390). At times
the Court even forfeited opportunities to recruit public support in
order to ensure the ANC's backing (p. 378).
To establish the existence of the second condition- the belief
of the dominant political force in judicial expertise- Roux relies
on historical scholarship other than his own. He presents the
origins of the South African elites' belief in legal expertise as
emerging from the process of colonial state formation and the rise
of apartheid (pp. 191, 197). Based on Martin Chanock's work,
Roux explains that "[i]n a country where law was so obviously
deployed as an instrument of social control and oppression,
lawyers' discourse on law played the role-common to most legalprofessional cultures, but intensified in the particular
circumstances of South Africa- of separating the realm of the
legal from the political" (p. 195). This legacy was persevered after
1993, as "the positive memory of formally rational law played a
crucial role in the transition to democracy, functioning as a shared
'mental model' that supplied the 'trust' required to drive the
negotiation process forward" (p. 196). Thus, although according
to the strategic model all politicians are merely strategic players
who are not persuaded by arguments but only driven by their
interest to be reelected, Roux cannot disregard the data from the
cultural vantage point. The historical data reveals that given this
legacy of judicial expertise, some of the ANC's leaders, and in
particular Nelson Mandela, just believed in complying with the
SACC's decisions, since they believed in its expertise even when
the SACC ruled against their interest (pp. 127, 173, 189). Even
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with rifts inside the ANC during the Mbeki presidency, and the
decline of strategic reasons for part of the ANC leadership to
support the Court, "very few attacks on the Court were in fact
launched, and none that could be described as successful" (pp.
186-187). The belief in the SACC's expertise was not necessarily
a belief only in judicial expertise in legal doctrine (though that
existed as welCx). Rather, as Roux explains, the ANC obeyed the
Court during the Chaskalson era given its commitment to human
rights, and because the Court was perceived as an expert in human
39
rights (p. 388).
According to Roux, the separation of law and politics, as well
as viewing the Court's work as purely legal, is still the
predominant way of thinking among South African elites (pp. 112,
213, 219, 382). Thus, the Court's decisions have been understood
by the elites as the decisions of an expert (pp. 3, 15). For this
reason, diverting from a "legally compelled" approach implies
heavy reputationallosses to the SACC (p. 289). Similarly, since
the elites comply with the Court's decisions because of its
expertise instead of its public support, it is not surprising that
Roux distinguishes between the United States and South Africa
in terms of the role of public opinion in determining the Court's
power. He explains that in Makwanyane the ANC's support was
able to "cushion" the Court from the adverse effects of public
opinion, in comparison to the United States where public opinion
has a more "powerful role" (p. 175 & n.1 01 ).
As long as the ANC is politically dominant and as long as
belief in legal expertise is dominant among the elites, the SACC
will function properly (pp. 175, 182). It might have decided
contrary to public opinion as well as contrary to the ANC's view,
but as long as it was perceived to follow the directives of its expert
knowledge, the ANC complied. The Court did not have the sword
or the purse, only judgment, and that worked fine. In this spirit,
Roux explains that its "light case load" allowed the Court
to concentrate on the careful wording of its decision. A strategy
that was primarily focused, not on popular acceptance of the
Court's role, but on the political branches' continued support

3X. Theunis Roux, Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South
Africa, 7 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 106, 13X (2009) ("ITihe CCSA's reputation for legally credihlc
decision making lending ... the ANC government's continued respect for, and ohedience
to, the CCSA 's decisions .... ").
39. See also Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits
of Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. Rrs. J. 63, 76-7X, X9 (1997) (detailing the ANC's
commitment to the language of human rights).
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for the constitutional project, required the Court to invest a
considerable amount of time and energy into crafting its
decisions for maximum justificatory effect (p. 383).

In other words, the SACC tried to exhibit good judgment and thus
to persuade the executive to enforce its judgments.
In an ironic twist, Roux juxtaposes the attitude of American
scholars towards the Chaskalson Court's record on social rights
with that of South African scholars. He explains American
scholars' appreciation of the Court given their acceptance of
"strategic compromises that constitutional courts rr1ay be required
to make." Roux points out that since in South Africa, "political
constraints under which constitutional courts operate are either
not seen at all or, if seen, are considered to be irrelevant to legalacademic criticism," South African scholars are much more
critical of the Court's record in this realm (p. 264 ). In essence,
Roux argues that in South Africa the belief in legal expertise is
such that scholars refuse to accept not following the correct result,
according to expert knowledge, in the name of strategic
considerations. One is thus left wondering why Roux adopts an
American paradigm to explain how the SACC can function
40
properly in the South African context.
Thus, in my view, the takeaway message from Roux's book is
that, as opposed to the controlling legitimacy paradigm, national
high courts do not need public support to function properly. As
long as the controlling elites perceive their national high court as
an expert in law and adopt its advice like a patient adopts her
doctor's advice, the court will be able to function properly, even
without public support. Exactly as the Federal Reserve Bank's
judgment in the United States is adopted by the executive, even
when it contradicts public opinion, since it is understood to be
based on expertise in economics, national high courts' judgments
can be adopted since they are understood to be based on judicial
expertise. As long as the executive is persuaded by the Court's
expertise and the system of governance as a whole possesses
public confidence, public support of a national high court is not
41
crucial for its proper function. The South African Constitutional
40. Cf Gihson & Caldeira, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that "it is unclear to what
degree findings'' that cstahlish the legitimacy paradigm in "long-cstahlishcd democratic
politics can he generalized to the world's emerging democracies.").
41. C). Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, Y3 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3X (1 Y7Y)
("Legitimacy docs not depend on popular approval of the institution's performance ....
It is the legitimacy of the political system as a whole that depends on the people's approval,
and that is the source of its democratic character.").
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Court's experience in its first ten years, as depicted by Roux,
validates this argument.
III. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
AS A STRATEGIC PLAYER
The question of whether the Court can function properly
without public support is distinct from the question of whether
judges believe that the Court requires such support and whether
they take into account public opinion in their adjudication. The
latter question concerns how judges decide cases. Roux is
interested in all of these questions. So far I have discussed only
the first question. Although the other questions are not at the
center of my review, Roux's discussion of the judges' strategic
behavior serves as a good indication of the judges' "legal
42
consciousness" or shared beliefs. It reveals the prevalence of the
belief in legal expertise among elites during the Chaskalson Court
era.
In his discussion of how the SACC's judges decided cases,
Roux adopts the strategic approach and assumes that judges
belie_ved that .in order to fulfil t~e.ir preferred policX the Court
requires pubhc support (the legitimacy paradigm).· However,
since Roux shows that the SACC did not require public support
to function properly, much of his analysis actually shows how the
Court acted strategically to preserve the AN C's support (pp. 288290, 388). This "managerialist strategy" (p. 392) relies on premises
that are closer to Hamilton's manner of thinking than to the
44
legitimacy paradigm.

42. Cf Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850~1940, in 3
RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 3, 6 (J. Spitzer cd., 1l)XO) ("The notion hchind the
concept of legal consciousness is that people can have in common something more
inllucntial than a checklist of facts, techniques, and opinions. They can share premises
ahout the salient aspects of the legal order that arc so hasic that actors rarely if ever hring
them consciously to mind.").
43. C}. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, TilE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 4X~4t) (1 Y9X)
(explaining that justices protect the Court's institutional legitimacy "as a means to an end
~a policy end."); HAIL, supra note 21, at 7 ("I take as assumed, as is common in the judicial
politics literature, that Supreme Court justices arc political actors with policy preferences
~ that is, preferences regarding policy outcomes ~ and Court decisions arc rcllcctions of
those preferences.").
44. But it docs not contradict the strategic approach because this approach is not
restricted to the idea that judges seck puhlic support. See HALL, supra note 21, at 11
("Typically, rational choice theorists assume that justices arc 'single-minded seekers of
legal policy,' hut that not need he the case. It is up to the researcher to specify the content
of actors' goals, and a few have explored objectives other than policy.").
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Roux presents SACC Judge Laurie Ackermann as having "a
profound sense of the determinacy of law as a professional
discipline" (p. 225). While, according to Roux, other judges did
not share this "sense" and viewed law also as a means to an end,
"[a ]II of them had been socialized in a legal-professional culture
in which the distinction between law and politics was highly
valued" (p. 230; see also p. 120). Thus, the South African judges
continued to view the "maintenance of the public's faith in the
ideal of adjudication according to the law as an essential
component of their work," not merely out of "strategic
advantage" but also out of "sincere commitment" to this ideal (p.
383; see also pp. 7-8). They "chose to present their decisions as
legally compelled" (p. 388). The idea of more openness to the
political nature of adjudication was "never really on the cards" (p.
384). Roux concludes his book stating that "[w]hile the Court's
decision-making record may be criticized for n1aintaining an
overly strict, and at times strained, conception of the law/politics
distinction, the judges' commitment to the liberal-legalist ideal
underlying this conception was sincere and genuine" (p. 387).
In comparison, American Justices are quite explicit today in
45
their belief in the need for public support for the Court. For
example, in his book, Making Our Democracy Work-A Judge's
View, Justice Stephen Breyer states that "[t]he Court itself must
help maintain the public's trust in the Court" in order to ensure
its proper function. 46 The controversy between current justices is
on how to acquire such support. Note that I do not claim that
American 1ustices state that the Court must follow public opinion.
Public support for an institution can be achieved by maintaining
its image as an expert that sometimes decides against public
47
opinion. Roux does not present evidence about the SACC
judges' views as to whether the Court needs public support.
Indeed, Raux's description of the judicial mindset of the
Chaskalson Court is consistent with a belief in expertise as the
Court's source of power rather than public support.
The question of whether judicial adherence to expertise as
the Court's source of legitimacy can be adequately depicted using

45. Bassok, supra note 12, at 25H--63 (surveying examples from recent years of
justices expressing their concern of puhlic confidence for the Court which they view as vital
for its proper function).
46. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK, at xiii (2010).
47. For distinguishing he tween these two positions, see Or Bassok, The Court Cannot
Hold, 30 J.L. & POL. 1, 37-3H (2014).
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the strategic approach is beyond the scope of this review. 4x At one
point Roux claimed that "[t]he more legally compelled" a certain
approach to the interpretation of the Constitution, "the heavier
the reputational losses attendant on rejecting it would have
been .... " (p. 289). Following this argument, one can translate an
expert's adherence to her expertise out of a belief in its intrinsic
value into a strategy for reputational gains. Thus, the Court's
tendency to adhere to the same doctrinal test in different fields, a
tendency that fits well the consistency and coherency of a legal
expert, "suggest[s]," according to Roux, "that more than a mere
doctrinal preference was at work" (p. 323). The strategic prism
leads Roux to conclude that the Court's adoption of "similar tests
from such different starting point suggests ... that the Court was
shaping the law to suit the long-term performance of its
institutional role in two inherently controversial areas of its
mandate" (p. 323). Consider the example of a doctor who
consistently prescribes a certain kind of antibiotics for several
similar illnesses out of a belief in the drug's efficacy. How would
you react to the suggestion that he does so out of strategic
calculation for enhancing his reputation among the drug
companies? What makes Roux conclude that the Court's
adherence to expertise is strategic rather than sincere?
Interestingly, Herman Pritchett, one of the fathers of the
strategic approach, apparently thought that before the spike in
American Justices' dissents at the beginning of the 1930s, the
strategic approach was not the most adequate one to explain the
49
United States Supreme Court's judgments. Viewing judicial
adherence to expertise as an instrument to recruit public support
is not an adequate explanation during periods in which the culture
of expertise reigns high. During these periods, the Court's
legitimacy was not understood in terms of public support. 5°

4~.
For such an attempt, sec, for example, LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 54 (2013) ("Doctrines such
as plain meaning ... and stare decisis ... cnahle judges ... to minimize controversy with
other hranchcs of government hy appearing to play a modest 'professional' role .... ").
49. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 43, at 24; C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 22 (1954) ("It is precisely hccausc the Court's
institutional ethos has hccomc so weak that we must examine the thinking of the individual
justices ... .");see also EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4~, at 66--fl7 (noting that
Pritchett "is rightly regarded as the founder of the quantitative social-scientific study of
judicial hchavior. ").
50. Determining the periods in which the culture of expertise reigned high is a
complex affair. It should he noted, however, that in the U.S. the process was not linear in
the sense of a continuous decline of the hdicf in expertise.
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Many viable perspectives are available for describing
phenomena. 51 One can describe a person to her friend by giving
the exact proportions of the chemical elements from which his
body was composed at that moment. Such a description offers the
most accurate scientific depiction of him currently available. Yet
it would be difficult to recognize him on the street according to
this description. One can analyze the question of whether a
woman is allowed to discriminate against white people and date
only black women according to legal analysis. After all, as Aharon
52
~arak and Elena Kagan tau&ht us, "l~w is everywhere" and. "it
Is law all the way down."-- Yet, this would be a categoncal
mistake, at least according to our current understandings of
choices in the realm of personal relationships. Viable perspectives
of this kind can be deployed so as to encompass every human
54
action under their wings. This is surely true with regards to the
strategic approach that can narrate any act as part of a strategy
for achieving a certain goae 5 For example, one can describe
scholars who adhere to the legitimacy paradig1m as strategic
players rather than as scientists dedicated to finding the truth.
According to this description scholars would prefer to follow the
controlling scientific Zeitgeist that views courts as strategic
players, rather than jeopardize their career by adhering only to
the contrasting findings and encountering great opposition within
56
their discipline. As for judicial decisions, as Robertson noted,
"[o]ne can frequently come up with a plausible post hoc account
of why a decision could have been strategic, whatever the judges
57
claimed as their reasoning." The only question is whether it is
51. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY (Keith AnsciiPcarson cd., Carol Dicthc trans., 1 YY4) (IHX7); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO
POWER§§ 1H1, 530 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdalc trans., 1%7) (1Y01).
52. Owen Fiss, Law Is Everywhere, 117 YALE L.J. 256, 25Y (2007) (explaining
Barak's ideas).
53. Bassok, supra note 47, at40--41 (explaining the ideology hchind Kagan's quote).
54. C'f. Kahn, supra note X, at 102 (noting that with regards to the political and legal
perspectives that "]tjhcsc arc systems of meaning, each of which can he deployed within
and ahout all of our political institutions.").
55. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREMI~ COURT AND THE
ATITrUDINAL MODEL REVISITED YH (2002) (explaining that rational choice theory "for
the most part" cannot he falsified since "]ijf any goals arc allowed, then there must always
he goals that can explain the hchavior in question.").
56. Cf LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION 211 (2001)
("]L]aw and economics advocates might he challenged to explain why their approach
cannot itself he understood as a rational adaptation to the market fmccs that favored its
development .... ").
57. ROBERTSON, supra note 13, at 25; see also Michaela Hailhronncr, Rethinking the
Rise of the German Constitutional Court: From Anti-Nazism to Value Formalism, 12 INT'L
J. CONST. L. 626, 63Y (2014) ("Nor should we confine ourselves to looking at constitutional
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the most adequate perspective. From Roux's description it is
unclear whether the most adequate perspective to describe the
SACC's adjudication is the strategic one.
CONCLUSION
Gazing through his "constitutional microscope," Theunis
Roux saw something he was not supposed to see. The SACC
functioned properly without public support, contrary to the
current controlling paradigm. As any scholar working within the
framework of a controlling paradigm, this result puzzled him as it
defied the entrenched legitimacy paradigm. While Roux
recognizes that this anomaly challenges the current controlling
paradigm, he attempts to subordinate it to the logic of the
paradigm. sH Yet his findings diverge from this framework. They
demonstrate, contrary to the controlling legitimacy paradigm,
that national high courts can function properly without public
support as long as the Court is considered by the governing elite
to be an expert. One may view Roux's discovery not as disproving
the ~egit~~acJ' paradigm but simply as narrowing its scope of
apphcabthty:
In any event, his discovery signals a major shift in the
understanding of national high courts. This shift also affects the
method of inquiry. Having a thick description of the local
understanding of legal expertise, as Roux offered, is clearly a
relevant factor for determining national high courts' ability to

courts merely as strategic actors seeking to carve out a maximum of power for themselves
in a larger institutional context, thus isolating them from their legal tradition and their
broader cultural context. J usticcs at constitutional courts have been first and foremost
educated, worked, and socialized for decades in a legal system before their appointment
to the court. Unsurprisingly, they will be inllucnced by their specific legal culture, and by
the more general attitudes towards authority in society.").
5K Cf KUHN, supra note 9, at 36-37 (explaining the scientist's puzzle-solving
function during normal science); id. at 46--47, 57-59 ("[T[hc perception of anomaly- of a
phenomenon, that is, for which his paradigm had not readied the investigator- played an
essential role in preparing the way for perception of novelty.").
59. One may argue that the legitimacy paradigm, in certain formulations, can
incorporate this adjustment. For example, distinguishing between compliance and
legitimacy allows one to argue that in order to achieve compliance (and thus to function
properly), a court need not have public legitimacy but only expertise in the eyes of the
elites. See also KUHN, supra note 9, at 9X-IOO, 122 (discussing the idea of narrowing
paradigms' range of application in order to salvage them); cf Gibson & Caldeira, supra
note 10, at 4 (distinguishing between compliance and legitimacy).
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function properly. Mere measurements of public support fail to
60
capture the entire picture.

60. See KUHN, supra note 9, at 5X-61 (explaining that shifts in paradigms hring shifts
in the standard tests we usc to understand reality); id. at 126 ("[O[pcrations and
measurements arc paradigm-determined.").

